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Abstract
Investing in renewable energy sources (RES) is one pivotal way to ensure future energy
sustainability that also mitigates climate change. The EU has committed to increase the
share of renewable energy (RE), and has tasked member states with targets. The Nether-
lands has now issued the ‘Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth’ to attain a share
of 14% RE by 2020. Coincidentally the theoretical knowledge of transition management
(TM) has been part of Dutch policy making since 2001. This thesis sets about analysing
how TM has been incorporated in this policy to appraise its probable eﬃcacy in meeting
the objective. First the transition typology is assessed. Then, through using the analytical
framework of TM as lens, the Energy Agreement is scrutinised. The policy’s strategic,
tactical, and operational levels are discerned, as well as their respective objectives, actions
and instruments. Co-evolution is furthermore examined. The study finds the energy tran-
sition to follow a targeted typology with much governmental interference and an integral
approach. Overall, the Energy Agreement follows the theoretical ideas of TM to a large
extent, where there is a multi-level and multi-actor approach. Nevertheless, there are some
parts within the Energy Agreement that are worrisome and can prove detrimental to its
own success. For example, co-evolution is hampered because the strategic level is locked
due to supranational influence. The analysis also demonstrates a dominance of incumbent
regime actors, as well as a strong focus on cost-eﬀectiveness that hampers innovation and
niche chances which are much needed for a longer-term energy transition. The findings
also point towards drawbacks of TM in itself where too much faith is fostered in the dom-
inant regime and government. As a result, enhanced niche participation and inclusion is
warranted to ensure the regime is fundamentally challenged. Furthermore, parameters are
needed for directed incrementalism to allow more time for niches to ripen. Finally, this
study illustrates the need to add an external, supranational level to be incorporated in the
analytical framework of TM to facilitate co-evolution.
Keywords: renewable energy – multi-level perspective – transition theory – co-evolution –
strategic niche management – feed-in tariﬀ – policy evaluation
Word count: 13 939
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Sustainability Problem
Discourse in energy policy is of high importance given the limited availability of petroleum
derivatives (e.g. oil and gas products). Virtually all societies depend heavily on these finite
resources to manufacture plastics, plastic derivatives and most importantly to burn them
for energy.
Energy security is an ever pressing issue. In many European countries the total crude oil
production from the North Sea is diminishing (MacKay, 2009, p. 5). The EU is one of
the biggest energy consumers (MacKay, 2009), yet it itself is energy poor. Consequently,
it depends heavily on imports from e.g. Russia, the Middle East and North America. Due
to recent developments in (shale)gas, the EU, as opposed to the US and the Middle East,
has relatively high energy and resource prices (Energy Agreement, 2013, p. 13). Also,
the Ukrainian crisis has illustrated how vulnerable European economies are once relations
with gas supplying countries outside the EU, in this case Russia, deteriorate. Volatile
energy prices and energy insecurity hamper investments and competition for international
companies. Especially in an export-oriented country like the Netherlands, such issues need
be addressed through sustainable energy usage; i.e. eﬃcient and renewable (ibid.).
Moreover, human activities increasingly exceed the world’s natural boundaries (Rockström
et al., 2009). One such boundary is climate change, where greenhouse gases, such as
carbon dioxide (CO2), have transgressed a safe operating level. As the widespread burning
of fossil fuels emits high levels of CO2, the way to mitigate climate change is to alter the
way we obtain our energy.
Investing in renewable energy sources (RES) is one pivotal way to ensure future energy
sustainability that also mitigates climate change. Mitigating greenhouse gases, in particular
the reduction of CO2 levels, is done throughout societies and at diﬀerent levels. For
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example, the current Dutch government has set a target of a 14% share of renewable
energy (RE) in the gross final consumption by 20201. Incidentally, this goal corresponds to
the mandatory target stipulated by the European Union’s 2009/28/EC directive (European
Commission [EC], 2009)2. On an EU-wide scale the total RE-level should equal 20%.
Individual country targets were determined by the availability of cheap natural RES. For
example, countries like Austria and Sweden with abundant hydro power have been assigned
higher targets. For the Netherlands, who lacks these, the target was set lower to equal
14%.
In order to meet this supranational objective, the Dutch government has issued the ‘Energy
Agreement for Sustainable Growth’; from now on referred to as the ‘Energy Agreement’.
This policy oﬀers insights to the Dutch governmental perspective in attaining this objec-
tive. The ultimate vision is a “fully sustainable energy provision” by the year 2050 (Energy
Agreement, 2013, p.1). As such, the Energy Agreement commits to attaining the RE
objective by 2020, as well as sets the first steps towards a full-scale sustainable energy
transition in the Netherlands.
Bringing about such sustainable socio-technical transitions, however, is not an easy task
due to “fundamental flaws within societal systems” (Rotmans, 2005, p. 4). Increasing
attention is thus directed to the study of transitions and how to facilitate them. Amongst
others, transition theory and transition management (TM) have emerged as tools to un-
derstand and manage (socio-technical) transitions. Such theories accentuate how existing
regimes impede transitions. These regimes are embedded deeply in society and charac-
terised by lock-in mechanisms which keep the socio-technical system in place. These
lock-in mechanisms result from sunk investments, vested interests, existing infrastructure,
regulations, subsidies, social traditions, etc (Geels, 2010). Since 2001, Dutch policy mak-
ers have adopted a transitions approach to their policy which is based on TM (Rotmans,
2005, p.55). TM was first used in the 2001 Fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy
Plan (NMP4), which according to Kern & Smith (2008) was the inception of the renew-
able energy transition in the Netherlands. This was also implemented for economic and
environmental reasons in the belief that an approach focused on innovation would lead to
more business (Loorbach, 2004, p.17).
The concept of TM is a recent phenomenon proposed by Rotmans et al. (2000). It can
be interpreted as a specific from of multi-level and multi-actor governance. It oﬀers a
framework for policy integration that manages transitions (Kemp et al., 2007, pp. 82,83).
Instead of using strict command and control it steers transitions through co-evolutionary
steering. This co-evolution happens between TM’s three levels; strategic (visions), tactical
1This study follows the definitions as giving by (European Commission [EC], 2009): a) the gross final
energy consumption is all the energy commodities delivered for energy purposes to industry, transport,
households, services, agriculture, forestry and fisheries . The share of renewable energy is calculated as final
consumption of renewable energy divided by the gross final consumption of energy from all energy sources.
2Also known as the 20/20/20 goals: 20% improvement in energy eﬃciency as opposed to their 1990
levels; 20% share of RE in the gross final consumption of energy; to be attained by 2020.
2
(agenda building), and operational (experiments). TM has gained considerable attention,
especially within energy transitions (cf. Raven, 2004; Kern & Smith, 2008; Verbong &
Geels, 2007). Applying TM appears politically feasible as it doesn’t disrupt existing policies.
Simultaneously, it holds the promise to overcome persisting problems, e.g. lock-ins, and
structurally alter social-technical systems (Kern & Smith, 2008).
1.2 Goal
The aim of this study is to get a grasp of the prospective eﬃcacy of the Energy Agreement
in facilitating the longer-term energy transition. In order to do so, the study deciphers how
the theoretical framework of TM is embedded into this policy, specifically with regards to
plans relating to RES. This is done in the belief that inclusion of TM in a policy will be
conducive to the success of achieving an actual society-wide energy transition.
1.3 Research Questions
The research question reads as follows:
How is the Dutch Energy Agreement in line with transition management?
Subsequent research questions that are linked to this question include:
• What is the ostensible typology of this transition/transformation led by this policy?
• What are the subsequent strategic (problem structuring/vision/long-term goals),
tactical (agenda-building, negotiation, networking) and operational (experimental
projects, innovations, implementation) levels in this policy for every RES?
• Is there co-evolution, i.e. interaction, between the levels mentioned above (monitor-
ing and evaluation of progress that leads to adaptation)?
1.4 Scope & Justification
This study is limited to the country of the Netherlands and its aforementioned Energy
Agreement policy. It can provide insights into the pending energy transition of the Nether-
lands; its current state and possible running course. What makes this case study of special
interest is its own context: the Netherlands is one of the countries within the EU with
the lowest levels of RE; (4% in 2012 (European Environmental Agency [EEA], 2013)).
In addition, the Netherlands, like many other countries, has been profoundly aﬀected by
the economic crisis of 2008. Economic recovery, however, has been relatively sluggish as
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opposed to other EU countries. At the same time it has had to adopt austerity mea-
sures to keep the yearly budget deficit within -3.0% margins, as to comply with prior EU
agreements.
The policy itself is interesting as it partly is the result of supranational decision-making
through the 2009/28/EC directive. Confronted with both a target and the strained eco-
nomic situation, the Dutch government evidently needs to address both issues simultane-
ously. Two main issues that at heart seem mutually exclusive and put the Dutch government
at a crossroads: for RES to become more widespread investments have to be made. Yet
investments currently are on the back burner (as the budget to inject extra money for such
investments is limited due to the austerity measures). Finally, time is limited: approximately
only five years remain for the supposed shift from close to 4% to 14% RE levels.
Analysing the Energy Agreement through a lens of TM seems feasible given previous adop-
tion. As of 2001, TM has been applied to policy making in the Netherlands. It therefore
seems highly likely that the policy makers of the Energy Agreement have employed a similar
transitions approach. Also the theory in itself is an appropriate way to solve the current
conundrum: in order to attain a sustainable energy transition, solutions should naturally
come from all levels within society. TM, as will be discussed more in-depth in section 3.3,
specifically puts emphasis on a blended approach of both top-down and bottom-up.
Lastly, insights in governance of sustainable energy transitions, ought appeal to all societies
throughout the world that rely on petroleum derivatives. Applying TM as a governance
model to facilitate such a renewable energy transition could thus interest any policymaker
and/or government.
1.5 Limitations
A limitation to this study is that it does not encompass a comparative study where it can
potentially learn from other, more successful countries when it comes to RE (transitions).
A comparative study was abstained from given that it mostly leads to case specific con-
clusions. Due to case characteristics interdependency and high specificity it has therefore
been opted to focus solely on the Netherlands. As a single case study, the study allowed
for a more in-depth focus of the sustainability problem.
Later on it became evident that a policy, focussing on this issue had been published by
the government (i.e. Energy Agreement). Focus successively turned to what measures are
intended for implementation and whether or not this policy will likely fulfil its aims. However,
given that the governmental plans still have to be executed and no real indicators were
available to test the visions, this proved practically impossible to determine. For example,
there was no apparent way to verify whether the Netherlands will ultimately reach 13,5%
or 17% share of RE in gross final consumption by the year 2020. Consequently, the policy
plans for renewable energy were scrutinised through an appropriate theory that functions as
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an analytical framework. As such it helps understand the underlying structures within the
socio-technical system. In addition, the chosen theory of TM which is specifically designed
to facilitate transitions, therefore seems to be an applicable tool to verify the eﬀectiveness
of the policy in achieving its goals, and in the longer-run a transition.
Time constraint poses another limitation. The empirical data to which there was access of
might not provide the full picture of the Energy Agreement. Nor might it provide all the info
needed to understand the entire process of the policy. The Energy Agreement is the result
and part of a larger process where various actors were involved and agreements were made.
For example, those actors with adequate actor competencies present in certain RES visions
and networks have likely been assessed during the conception of the Energy Agreement.
Such data have not explicitly been published within the Energy Agreement and thus it
could not be studied whether actor competencies have been guaranteed. Thereon, fluidity
of actor participation throughout the process (i.e. their ability to enter and leave networks)
could not be appraised. Nor could it be verified whether the current circumstances of the
Energy Agreement allow for future actor fluidity throughout the transition.
A final limitation is the succinctness of the policy with regards to TM. For every RES it is
discernible what the strategic, tactical and operational levels are. However, in deeper detail
discerning the various TM instruments and actor competencies needed at every objective is
more diﬃcult due to limited information. Such details have most likely been involved in the
larger process, but have not been documented for in the current printed form. Therefore,
such aspects of TM have been analysed on a broader level for the policy. Even if there
are cues for the presence of TM in the Energy Agreement, one cannot expect the policy
to follow TM every step in the way. Rotmans (2005) already noted that TM should be
applied within policies, more or less hidden within the political content itself.
1.6 Audience
The thesis is written to appeal to academia, LUMES students, policy makers and stake-
holders. It aims to inform about the current state energy consumption in the Netherlands,
as well as to provide insights into a governance model that facilitates a renewable energy
transition. Hopefully it can thereby contribute to the Dutch energy discourse as well as
other policymakers and/or governments, and discourse on TM.
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Chapter 2
Methodology & Methods
2.1 Epistemological & Ontological Considerations
This section clarifies the research paradigm that has structured the study in itself, i.e. its
conceptualisations and operations. The paradigm covers three areas of considerations; on-
tology, epistemology and methodology (for the latter, see section 2.2 Methodology).
Ontology pertains to what makes up reality. Whether or not there is such a thing as a
‘real’ world that exists independent of our knowledge (Marsh & Furlon, 2002, p. 18). In
sociology the idea with ontology is to describe society and its diﬀerent parts and processes.
The purpose is to understand and describe underlying structures that aﬀect individuals
and groups. The ontology that informs the methodology of this study is objectivism.
Objectivism asserts that social phenomena exist independently as external facts from the
social actors themselves (Bryman, 2012, pp. 32,33).
Ontology influences the epistemology (Marsh & Furlon, 2002, p. 18). Epistemology,
as a theory of knowledge, concerns itself with questions relating to what reality can be
perceived, and how it can be obtained. In other words; how does one know something.
It encompasses the relationship that exists between the beholder and knowledge (ibid.,
Vasilachis de Gialdino, 2009, p. 19). Throughout this study an epistemological position of
critical realism is upheld. It is related to positivism which has a tendency towards deductive
or theory-testing approaches (Bryman, 2012, p. 27). Critical realism shares two main
features with positivism: 1) a deep-rooted belief that the natural and social sciences can
and should apply the same approach of data collection and explanation; and 2) that there
is an external reality separate from our descriptions of it (Bryman, 2012, p. 29). However,
critical realism implies that scientists’ conceptualisations simply reflect a way of knowing
reality. Thereby it departs from the positivist idea that scientists’ conceptualisations of
reality actually directly reflect reality in itself (ibid.).
Critical realism sets about recognising the reality of the natural order and discourses present
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in the social world (ibid.). Bhaskar (1989) proclaims that the social world can only be
understood by identifying the underlying structures at work through practical and theoretical
work of social sciences. As such an epistemology of critical realism is warranted as the study
sets about theoretically understanding the natural order and underlying structure of Dutch
energy (transition).
2.2 Methodology
The methodology forms the strategic approach to how knowledge was sought and research
was carried out. The methodology of this study is policy analysis: as the scrutiny of
the Energy Agreement is the main focus of this study. In doing so, the study adopts an
analytical approach where the policy will be studied qualitatively. Hereby the theory of TM
will be used as the analytical framework.
With the Energy Agreement as a policy being the main subject, this study eﬀectively
comprises a case study. Given that no further generalisations can be made beyond this
case with its own particularities and distinctness, it constitutes a so-called intrinsic case
study (Stake, 2000, p.437). This was deemed justified as this policy and the country it
refers to are so specific in their own respect. As such no generalisations needed be made
beyond this scope. The analysis and eventual forthcomings from this study need only give
insights and contribute to the discussion that prevail within the governance of this specific
country.
According to Blok (2007, p. 247) policies can be evaluated by the following aspects;
eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness and/or its side eﬀects. The evaluation of a given policy can either
be before its implementation, so-called ex-ante evaluation, or after its implementation, so-
called ex-post evaluation. Since this agreement has only been signed as of September last
year, its implications are yet to be witnessed. This study will therefore naturally comprise
an ex-ante eﬀectiveness evaluation. When evaluating ex-ante eﬀectiveness, however, with
the exception of using TM, it appears hard to apply indicators for the evident reason that
they simply don’t exist for future progression of RE generation.
2.2.1 Methodologic Considerations
Within qualitative research the issues regarding reliability and validity need be addressed.
External reliability (also known as dependability), is more problematic within qualitative
research given the generally lower degree of replicability due to the context specificity
(Bryman, 2012). Given that this thesis deals with naturally occurring data, i.e. the existing
policy being available to all, replicability ought not pose a problem.
Internal validity or credibility can be problematised with regards to the match between the
researcher and the theoretical ideas developed. This will be solved by looking at various
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theories and carefully selecting the most applicable one. External validity or transferability,
refers to the degree of generalising the findings. Given that the research is an intrinsic
case study it exhibits a low degree of generalisability. However, given the aforementioned
context specificity and the discussion it is pertinent to, this is negligible.
2.3 Methods
Methods applied in this case study are:
1. Review of literature on transition theories, Dutch state of energy, and RES develop-
ments (e.g. statistical, technical & economical), modes of governance.
2. Analysis of the Energy Agreement by applying the theoretical knowledge of TM as
an analytical framework.
Data was collected through a study of statistics, policies, legislations and scientific litera-
ture. To go about answering the research questions, a review on background information
was undertaken (qualitative data) to shed light on the current state & trends of energy in
the Netherlands. It applies data and statistics from governmental bodies such as Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek (Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics; (CBS)) and Agentschap
NL (Netherlands Enterprise Agency) (quantitative data). Reviews on transition theories,
governance, as well as of national - and international public documents were also under-
taken. These include e.g.; Dutch policies (incl. the Energy Agreement and related policies),
European directives, EEA, etc. As the relevant data, i.e. the policy itself and any related
statistics, already have been published and exist, they form naturally occurring data.
In order to analyse the main policy of interest, reviews are done on scientific literature
(inter alia those pertaining to transitions, transition management, typologies). Through
comparing various theories relating to governance and transitions, the theory of TM was
opted to assess the Energy Agreement (For more on TM see section 3.3 on p. 14). The
theoretical knowledge provided by TM is operationalised through using it as a analytical
framework (see both figure 3.4 & table 3.1 on pp. 16 & 19). As such, this thesis is struc-
tured and carried out in a deductive fashion, even though deductive strategies inexorably
bear some inductive elements (Bryman, 2012, pp.24,26). Instead of proving any theory
with the data, the theory will be applied onto the data. It thereby functions as a tool
which aids in analysing and assessing the data (especially the main policy of interest here).
Thus, a deductive approach ostensibly is most applicable to the existing policy to test for
its robustness. In eﬀect, the theory is not grounded in relation to this research.
2.3.1 Methodic Considerations
An analysis of the scientific literature will most likely lead to diverse opinions and therefore
sketch a realistic picture. Using public documents from the Dutch government, however,
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inadvertently gives more biased views which tend to be in line with the views and interests
of the current government or organisation.
TM, as an analytical framework, was mainly selected to analyse the Energy Agreement be-
cause of its applicability as an analytical framework. Moreover, historical evidence suggests
that the Energy Agreement most likely is theoretically informed by TM. TM as a theory,
however, has also been the subject of some criticism. Given that TM is used as a key tool
to analyse the Energy Agreement these criticisms should duly be taken into account. For
more detailed information regarding the criticisms, see also section 3.4.
To ensure precision and depth, the study is limited to the two aforementioned methods.
Thereby interviews are excluded and triangulation of findings is avoided. Triangulations,
though, are popular within social science given that they potentially increase confidence in
findings and can reveal “the whole picture” (Bryman, 2012, p.717).
Silverman (2010, pp.134,135) however, criticises blunt usage of triangulation as it can
lead to under-analysed data, impreciseness and/or loss of theoretical consistency as it
promptly widens a study’s scope. Instead, he posits that without triangulation a particular
phenomena can be researched with rigour into details. Therefore it was consciously opted
to not allow for a triangulation of results.
Use of interviews is also abstained from because of the topic and the research approach.
Of primary interest is the empirical naturally occurring data; i.e. the actual policy content,
as well as facts relating to targets, technology & implementation. As such, knowledge
of underlying assumptions or views on the set targets, what sustainability entails or why
certain targets were ultimately chosen, are deemed redundant.
9
Chapter 3
Theory
A theoretical framework is relevant to the purpose of the thesis and the empirical material
presented in this study. Theoretically grounded reflections will underpin the analysis. The
chosen theory is used as an analytical framework to analyse the Energy Agreement in itself
and the approach in solving the sustainability issue. For this one needs to start looking at
what transitions are, transition typologies and which theory most aptly fits this study.
3.1 What Is a Transition?
The concept of transition was first coined in the 19th century by Alex de Tocqueville. Since
then it has become widespread, being adopted in an array of scientific disciplines (Lachman,
2013). It typically refers to the “ idea of short revolutionary period breaking incremental or
gradual processes of change in complex systems” (Loorbach, 2004, p.2). Rotmans (2005)
coins a transition as a “structural social change that is the result of economic, cultural,
technological, institutional as well as environmental developments, which both influence
and strengthen each other" (p. 11). As such, it is the result of both market and systems
failures (ibid, p.13). A transition exhibits non-linear behaviour and typically spans one or
two generations (i.e. 25-50 years) (Loorbach, 2004, p.3).
Rotmans furthermore presents four hypotheses that typify a successful transition. The first
includes its dynamics which progress non-linearly with relatively slow and fast alternating
phases in a multi-phase concept (p.23; see also figure 3.1 on the next page). Four dif-
ferent phases are distinguished here; (i) a pre-development phase, (ii) take-oﬀ phase, (iii)
acceleration phase, and (iv) stabilisation phase.
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Figure 3.1 – Diﬀerent phases and trajectories of transitions. After pre-development and take-
oﬀ there are various ways as to how transitions proceed. Some accelerate and stabilise whereas
others get stuck and lock-in, reverse through backlash, or the system as a whole breaks down
after take-oﬀ. Source: Rotmans, 2005
3.1.1 Multi-level Perspective
The second hypothesis that Rotmans (2005) applies, builds upon Geels & Kemp (2000)’s
multi-level perspective (MLP) of transitions. This regulatory framework describes transition
dynamics in functional terms. That is, it focusses on understanding how a transition arises.
The MLP holds that changes in the dominant existing regime result from the regimes
interactions with technological novelties and the larger socio-technical landscape (Geels,
2004, p.899). The MLP has incorporated these factors into three levels: the micro-
(niches), meso- (regimes), and macro levels (the socio-technical landscape)1: see figure 3.2
on the following page. According to the second hypothesis, a transition will only take place
once the three functional micro-, meso-, and macro levels strengthen one another in the
same direction (Geels & Schot, 2007).
• Micro-level
The micro-level consists of niches. Niches form protective environments where new
ideas, social networks, concepts and technologies emerge. These novelties deviate
from the existing regime, elicit poor performance and uncertainty, and provide oppor-
tunities for learning processes. A protective market environment is realised through
strategic investments within companies, subsidies or public authorities (Geels, 2004,
p.912). After maturing they might compete with (elements of) the dominant regime.
• Meso-level
The meso-level contains the dominant rules, regimes and practices. The associ-
1Note that Rotmans (2005) takes a societal system as a reference unit as opposed to Geels & Kemp’s
(2000) original multi-level concept. They use techniques and technologies as a point of departure. The
framework in itself, however, is essentially the same.
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Figure 3.2 – Multi-level perspective on transitions with diﬀerent functional scale levels. Source:
Rotmans, 2005
ated prevailing structures, institutions and organisations maintain a status quo that
strengthens their position and interactions (Rotmans, 2005). Geels (2004, p.910)
finds them to be governed by three types of rules; normative (social and organisa-
tional networks’ expectations and perceptions), regulative & formal (legally binding
contracts), and cognitive (where knowledge development is geared towards). These
rules typically align and strengthen one another that keeps the regime in place.
• Macro-level
The macro-level encompasses the overarching, exogenous environment/setting for
socio-technological systems. These can include shared cultural factors, ethics, val-
ues, beliefs and existing material environments (e.g. climate change), but also supra-
national entities such as the UN and WTO or global agreements such as the Kyoto
protocol. They are typically factors beyond influence of control and command from
the regime level (Geels, 2004, p.13), and are relatively slow trends and developments
(Geels & Kemp, 2000, p.17).
This multi-level perspective has proven rather versatile as it has been applied to various
reference units, for example: transitions of techniques, technologies or societal systems at
large. Even though Rotmans (2005) adaptation deviates slightly from the original frame-
work, this study will continue in line with Rotmans, as it pertains largely to a societal system
transition.
The third hypothesis regarding transitions is the nature of their dynamics. These are
characterised by alternating phases of relative construction and destruction with a generic
cyclical pattern (Rotmans, 2005, p.27). The final hypothesis argues that transitions cannot
be directed in the sense of command and control, but influenced at the slightest. Especially
the direction and speed can be influenced through co-evolutionary steering. These are
best described through the transition management (TM) concept (see section 3.3 on
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page 14).
3.2 Transition Typologies
There are various ways to typify a transition, examples include:
Boulding (1970)
Distinguishes between: deterministic, evolutionary, dialectic, teleological or target-
oriented transitions.
Berkhout et al. (2004)
Perceive two main dimensions for transitions:
Availability of resources and the degree of coordination. These successively lead to
the following transition typologies; emergent transformation, reorientation of trajec-
tories, endogenous renewal and purposive transition.
Rotmans (2005)
Identifies and distinguishes between three dimensions within a transition:
(i) targeted vs. emergent nature of transitions.
(ii) high vs. low degree of coordination; where high coordination denotes much
interference from the government.
(iii) high vs. low aggregation; where high aggregation denotes an integral approach
at either a domain or sector level. This typology is illustrated as follows in fig 3.3.
3.3 Transition Management
The multitude of problems that societies alike are confronted with cannot simply be cor-
rected by the market, since there is no correcting mechanism (Rotmans, 2005). The
resulting crises need be solved by adequate governance, which regularly lead to transitions
with a targeted typology. Governing societal change into a targeted direction however
hasn’t proven to be easy. It has become evident that steering change through individual
authority or through liberalising markets won’t suﬃce (Loorbach, 2004, p.5).
Loorbach (2004) argues that the persistent problems and the lack of sustainable develop-
ment partly are the result of the maladapted organisation of societal systems. According to
him, such societal systems in their entirety, including public management organisations, are
not able to overcome their own system structures and break through path-dependencies.
In order to change the unsustainable structures of the system, management principles
based on the dynamics and behaviour of complex systems are needed (Loorbach, 2004,
p.16).
With political elections every four years, however, governments themselves typically un-
dergo structural short-term changes. Simultaneously they apply short-term actions in
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Figure 3.3 – A typology of transitions based on three main properties; targeted or emergent,
level of coordination (from the state), and level of aggregation (where high denotes an integral
approach at domain or sector level). Source: Rotmans, 2005
solving long-term problems (Kemp et al., 2007, p.82). Incremental strategies to reach
a long-term change are problematic as they likely do not adequately address the underly-
ing systemic failures in the long-run. This, amongst others, explain why various scholars
have questioned the eﬃcacy of governments, especially in light of sustainability (Delmas &
Young, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; Kemp et al., 2007; Loorbach, 2004; Mayntz, 1993;
Pierre & Peters, 2000). To deal with this inherent flaw in light of transitions, attention
has increasingly been directed towards TM.
TM builds upon transition theory, whose main principles already have been covered through
the multi-level concept (fig. 3.2) and fig. 3.1, which illustrate how transitions are believed to
respectively originate and subsequently progress. TM, as a form of multi-level governance,
endeavours to bridge the gap between top-down & bottom-up governance (Kemp et al.,
2007, p.80).2 Eﬀectively it is more than either incrementalism as this is a bottom-up
approach, as well as more than comprehensive planning which is a solely top-down approach
(Kemp et al., 2007, p.89).3 Consequently as a goal-oriented modulation, TM can also be
called for directed incrementalism.
TM is a multi-actor process. It encourages the participation from relevant government, so-
2For TM’s fundamental assumptions, see p. 43 in Rotmans (2005).
3For a comprehensive overview of how TM diﬀers from incrementalism at various aspects, see also table
1 in Kemp et al. (2007).
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cial organisations, companies, knowledge institutions and intermediary organisations (Rot-
mans, 2005, p.38). Relevant actors are those that can participate in the dialogues and
at the same time have the means to influence and change their own organisation ac-
cording to the agreements/transition paths opted. According to the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Aﬀairs (EZ), a transition path is a “consistent set of actions, fulfilled precon-
ditions and learning experiences that lead to fulfilment of the ambition formulated ” (EZ,
2004, p.19).
In sum, TM allows for state and non-state actors to come together and co-operatively
produce and coordinate policies in an iterative and co-evolutionary manner (Kemp et al.,
2007, p.82). Hereby it relies on the conditions under which market forces operate, as well
as decentralised actors (Kemp et al., 2007, p.87).
It should be noted that TM is not so much a form of governance that exercises stringent
command and control (Kemp et al., 2007, p.87). Instead, it can be viewed as a steering
framework in governance. This is in line with more modern thoughts where a distinction is
made between governments and governance (Verbong & Geels, 2007; Delmas & Young,
2009). TM’s activities are aimed at influencing, organising and coordinating processes at
three distinct levels with their respective actors, as to align them and reinforce one another
towards a desired direction (Rotmans, 2005, p.28; Kemp et al., 2007, p.83). The three
levels are as follows:
Figure 3.4 – TM’s multilevel approach. Levels are being influenced and steered to align and
reinforce one another (they are thus connected and exert influence). Source: Kemp et al.,
2007
1. Strategic level - Vision development.
Here strategic discussions are held and long-term objectives are set (Loorbach, 2004,
p.8). In order to do so, there must be a multi-actor innovation network at the
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strategic level. A limited number of the various actors need be brought together as
to highlight the diversity of views of the problem, the long-term goal(s) and myriad
directions of solutions. Involvement is not limited to involved policy makers and
managers. Quintessential is that so-called ‘niche actors’ are included which more or
less already operate autonomously from the current regime; e.g. forerunners. Fluidity
is important; as a social ‘network of innovation’ evolves, participants should be able
to enter and drop out continuously throughout the process.
Visions will be set up after the participants have come to a joint new perspective of
how to realise the transition of the problem. Also these visions need be adaptive;
they need to evolve according to the process and be instrumental (Rotmans, 2005,
p.47). From the vision various transition paths are derived with a common transition
agenda.
2. Tactical level - Agenda building.
From the multi-actor networks self-formed coalitions need be formed for negotiation
(Loorbach, 2004, p.8). Thereon intermediate objectives can be set into the transition
paths that lead to the transition image(s). Here the multitude of interests, motives
and policies of all the actors can be presented. From there on negotiations can
be made about investments. These in turn will pave the way for individual plans
and strategies. A prerequisite is that the actors involved have the ability to apply
the transition vision to their own organisation. As involved organisations and/or
networks change according to the transition vision, tensions can arise between it and
contemporary policy agendas. If necessary then reconsiderations need be made at
the strategic level.
A requirement for actors is that there are not too many and that those involved pos-
sess the competencies needed for TM. These include; problem perception & struc-
turing at high levels of abstraction, exchange of perspectives beyond their discipline,
agenda development, vision forming, stimulating, analysis & negotiation, forming
coalitions, imbedding in networks & institutions, experimenting, implementation (see
also table 3.1 on page 19).
3. Operational level - Implementing and experimenting.
It is at this level that actual transition actions and experiments are executed (Loor-
bach, 2004, p.8). Here projects are designed, implemented, evaluated, and developed
further. Rotmans (2005) describes experiments as technological, institutional or cul-
tural innovations. They are characterised by practicality and a high chance of failure,
making them risky. He furthermore emphasizes the critical role that social learning
plays; where there is “ learning by doing and doing by learning” (p.51). Ultimately
transition experiments stimulate and develop new forms of cooperation, coalitions,
networks and arrangements based on social learning.
Throughout their interactions the aforementioned levels ‘co-evolve’, where “we speak of co-
evolution if the interaction between diﬀerent societal subsystems influences the dynamics
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of the individual societal subsystems, leading to irreversible patterns of change.” (Kemp et
al., 2007, p.80). Eﬀectively, the three levels will align and reinforce one another.
When it takes into eﬀect, TM thus consists of four types of activities: strategic transition
arena (tied to the strategic level of problem structuring and vision development), tactical
transition coalitions and networks (tied to the tactical level of agenda building and transition
paths), actual experiments and projects at the operational level, and finally the monitoring
and evaluation of progress that leads to adaptation; co-evolution (Kemp et al., 2007, p.82).
These four phases alternate one another, and are also known as the cycle of TM. Finally,
this model builds upon the belief that transitions result from all relevant actors within a
level and the subsequent interactions between the levels (Kemp et al., 2007, p.80,82).
In order to understand the levels of figure 3.4 more thoroughly in practical terms, see
table 3.1.
3.4 Criticisms to TM
Albeit being a promising theory, TM has received some due criticism. Criticisms concerning
TM include (Lachman, 2013):
• It has proven diﬃcult to assess whether TM actually works since it is hard to apply
TM in practice.
• Current literature predominately focusses on niche-regime interactions instead of ac-
tual transition managing.
• TM holds the deep-rooted belief that transitioning is a managerial task. There are
also additional influences such as culture, political interest or belief systems, that both
from outside and within transition management, could obstruct managing transitions
according to best management practices and rules.
• Kern & Smith (2008) claim that TM has a bias towards the incumbent regime
actors, thereby overriding actors at niche levels. This comes from the lack of models,
practices, tools that would empower niches to break into the meso/regime level. This
was especially evident when TM was applied within policy making.
3.5 TM in Practice
The analytical framework of TM will form the backdrop of this study to analyse and map
out what is going on in the policy (see table 3.1). It will help in understanding if and how
TM is embedded in the Energy Agreement. Possibly, it will give cues about a successful
future for the Dutch Energy transition.
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Table 3.1 – TM in practice with the objectives, actions, instruments and actor competencies
at each specific level. Based on: Loorbach (2004) & Rotmans (2005).
Level Objectives Actions Instruments Actor
competencies
Strategic Anticipation Problem
perception &
structuring
Integrated systems
analysis
Systems thinking,
Abstract capacity
Coordination Exchange of
perspectives,
Agenda
development
Transition arena,
Transition agenda
Communication
skills, Strategic
insight
Future
orientation
Vision forming Scenario
development,
Transition images
Imaginative
capacity,
Creativity
Tactical Variation Stimulating Transition agenda
Transition paths
Co-productive
thinking
Selection Analysis &
Negotiation
Transition
monitoring &
evaluation,
Innovation
networks
Analytic ability,
Negotiation
skills
Networks Forming
coalitions, Imbed-
ding in
networks &
institutions
Arenas of
arenas,
Innovation
networks
Communication
and consensus
building
Operational Development Experimenting Experimental spaces Learning and
communication
Innovation Implementation Test laboratories,
Practical
experiments
Project
Management
The strength from this table is that each level can be assessed when analysing the Energy
Agreement. More problematic is how to test for co-evolution: this problem stems from the
fact that co-evolution typically happens throughout the transition process. However, the
policy as published only allows for a pre-transition snapshot of how the Netherlands plans
to go about enabling the transition. The author of this ex-ante study thus acknowledges
the diﬃculty in appraising any co-evolution.
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Chapter 4
Background & Key Concepts
4.1 Renewable & Sustainable Energy
In order to start the discourse on energy however, one needs to discern between two often
erroneously mixed concepts: renewable and sustainable energy.
Renewable energy — comes from those sources which can be naturally replenished within
days or several hundred years, as long as it isn’t used up faster than it is renewed (Miller
& Spoolman, 2012, p.11). These include: wind, solar, biomass, hydroelectric, wave, tide.
Nuclear energy is in itself not renewable as the resources need be mined and are finite.
Sustainable energy — requires a notion of what sustainability is. A point of departure is
the so-called ‘tripple bottom line’ of sustainable development. This includes accounting for
the biosphere, economy as well as society (Delmas & Young, 2009). Investing in a RES
that for example neglects economic, or ecological limits, is unfeasible. Orecchini (2011)
lists the following five constituents of sustainable energy1:
• Renewability of energy resources
• Eﬃciency of energy conversion, distribution, usage
• Lowering the level of environmental impact (e.g. substituting coal with nuclear)
• Accessibility of energy (this is mostly guaranteed within developed countries)
• Adapt energy systems to local socio-economic-environmental conditions (pivotal in
the case of decentrally generated (renewable) energy)
1Orecchini (2011) is extremely brief in his definition of sustainable energy. As a consequence there is
some room for interpretation, as is done above between parentheses.
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4.2 Energy in the Netherlands
4.2.1 Energy Composition
Figure 4.1 – Total energy consumption (in PJ) of the Netherlands by source throughout the last
decade. “Others” includes energy from nuclear, waste and electricity. These numbers are taken
directly from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Unfortunately, no specification is
made where this electricity exactly originates from. Source: CBS StatLine
The Netherlands has a high per capita energy consumption due to its economy being
dominated by petrochemicals, greenhouse horticulture and transport (CBS, 2011, p.76).
As a result the Dutch industries have become relatively energy eﬃcient as opposed to
similar industries in other European countries. Compared to other European countries
the Netherlands also holds a relatively large reserve of natural gas. These deposits are
estimated to last for another 30 years (National Government of the Netherlands, 2014),
however social discontent has intensified recently regarding extraction.
As figure 4.1 shows, the total amount of energy consumed from renewable sources has been
increasing only slightly this past decade. In 2012, RE accounted for 4.4% of total energy
use (nearly 100 PetaJoule (PJ2)). That RE share of total final consumption is nonetheless
nearly identical to 2011 levels (NL Agency, 2013). Biomass was the main source, making
up more than 75%; see fig. 4.2. This is largely produced by waste incineration plants, co-
firing of biomass in power plants, use of wood stoves and use of biofuels in the transport
sector (ibid.). Solid biomass is predominately imported in the form of wood pellets. The
last couple of years this import amounted around 20 PJ each year, which is around 40% of
21 J equals 0,24 calorie. 1 PJ is the equivalent of 31.6 million m3 natural gas or 278 million kWh; the
yearly amount of electricity consumed by 15.000 households.
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total biomass consumption (CBS, 2012). In 2012, 12% of all RE came from the co-firing
of biomass in electricity power plants, approximately 11 PJ (ibid.).
Wind power had a share of nearly 13%. Hydropower, solar energy and geothermal all played
minor roles. Even though solar power plays an insignificant role, the solar energy generation
more than doubled in 2012 (CBS, 2012).
In the same year at least 10% of all electricity was produced from renewable resources.
The amount of renewable resources used for heating was at least 3%, and the role of
renewables in transport equalled 5% (CBS, 2012). Overall, it has been estimated that an
additional 300 PJ from renewable resources is needed to achieve the target of 14% overall
RE consumption (NL Agency, 2013; Energy Agreement, 2013).
Figure 4.2 – Overview of share of various RES of total RE in 2012. Levels are shown in
percentages. Source: CBS Statline
The backward position of RE consumption that the Netherlands takes within the EU can
partially be explained by the limited availability of hydro power. Low diﬀerences in elevation
of the Dutch landscape and rivers restrict harnessing of hydro power. In addition, house-
holds have an on average low consumption of biomass, stemming from high urbanisation
levels with well established grid connections. In turn, this allowed for a solid supply of
natural gas for heating. Furthermore, the amount of forests available per inhabitant are
comparatively inexistent to other countries. Finally, the Dutch government hasn’t actively
been supporting more costly ‘novel’ forms of RES such as wind or solar energy, unlike
Denmark, Germany or Spain (CBS, 2012, pp.25,26).
4.2.2 Dutch Governance
The way of governing in the Netherlands has been coined the ‘polder model’ and has booked
some ravishing successes as well as failures. As a ‘consensus democracy’ that uses elaborate
public inquiries to come to broad societal support (Rotmans, 2005, p.9). It is in essence
corporatist and predominately represents vested interests (Schoo, 2004, p.73).
21
In their 2007 study, Verbong & Geels discuss incumbent barriers to the energy transition in
the Netherlands. They also argue that the energy transition has its roots in the 1960s and
1970s. Its drivers have predominately been liberalisation and Europeanisation (the latter is
further strengthened by the 2009/28/EC directive). They finally quip that environmental
aspects have only played an insignificant role thus far.
SDE+ Policy Scheme
To promote the use of RES, the so-called SDE+ subsidy scheme has been put into eﬀect.
SDE is short for ‘Sustainable Energy Incentive’, where the ‘+’ denotes a newer policy. The
scheme aids the adoption of RES by covering the diﬀerence between grey energy and the
price paid for RES over a five, twelve or sometimes even fifteen-year period. The subsidy
depends on the type of technology used. In spite of the large number of SDE+ grants
there hasn’t been a sharp increase in the production of RE so far. According to the NL
Agency (2013, p.15) this is because a considerable part of the subsidised capacity is yet
to be realised. The budget for RES will gradually amount to§3.0 billion/y by the year 2020.
Additional policies adopted by the government are so-called Green Deals between state
and citizens, civil society organisations or businesses. These deals endeavour to promote
collaboration, remove existing barriers or modify laws and regulations. Another initiative is
the Renewable Energy Netherlands (DEN) programme which creates knowledge networks.
DEN facilitates RES projects by closing the gap between Top sector energy innovators and
market application of REs (NL Agency, 2013).
4.2.3 The Dutch Grid
The biggest energy producers include; Electrabel, RWE/Essent, Eneco, Intergen, Delta,
E.ON Benelux3, EP2 and NUON (part of Vattenfall). Since 1998, TenneT has been the
national Transmission System Operator (TSO) that owns the Dutch, as well as parts of
German grid. It connects all regional grids and connects to European ones. There are over
20 energy distribution companies (EDCs) that have been around since 1989.
The Netherlands takes in a pivotal position in the Northwestern European Energy Market.
It cooperates, for example, within the pentalateral Energy Forum. This forum acts as
a framework for regional cooperation towards electricity market integration and security
of supply. The parties involved are the Benelux, Germany, France, Austria and Switer-
land. The Netherlands also has additional bilateral agreements with Germany, as well as
agreements with other countries in the North Sea areas, inter alia UK, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden & Ireland (Energy Agreement, 2013). As a result, it acts as a hub where energy
is being transported and distributed to other countries. Overall, the country imports a lot
3Benelux denotes the union of countries comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg
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of energy, however, simultaneously exporting most of it as crude oil products to the other
countries4.
4.3 Summary Energy Agreement
This section will first cover some background information regarding the policy in itself
followed by a succinct summary of its ten pillared content.
On 6th of September, 2013 the ‘Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth’ was pre-
sented by the Dutch government. The policy is the result of long deliberations that
brought together various stakeholders (i.e. scientists, politicians, employers, employees,
environmental- and energy organisations, and decentralised authorities). The design of
its content was placed under the supervision of the Social & Economical Council of the
Netherlands (SER), with strong support by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (PBL), Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) & Economical Institute
for Construction (EIB).
Central to the policy is that the goals of RE are deeply enmeshed with boosting the cur-
rent economic system. The policy oﬀers a long-term perspective for robust and widely
supported energy governance. Special attention goes out to the Dutch economy. Hereby,
focus is also laid on creating additional jobs (at least 15.000 full time) and boosting in-
vestments in the stagnant economy, ever since the onset of the economic crisis of 2008.
Apart from abiding by the EU directive to harness a total of 14% RE by 2020, the policy
also paves the way for obtaining “fully sustainable energy provisioning” by the year 2050
(Energy Agreement, 2013, p.1).
The content can be roughly characterised by five aspects: (i) reduction in energy use; (ii)
RE; (iii) investment and employment; (iv) burden relief through subsidies and taxation;
and (v) an overall integral approach5 The policy builds upon ten, interrelated, compo-
nents:
Increased Energy Eﬃciency — Energy savings are recognised to contribute to environ-
mental goals, lead to lower energy bills, increase Dutch international competition and give
new impetus to job creation. Annually this entails savings of 1.5% of final energy use
(complying with the EU Energy Eﬃciency Directive). A total energy savings of 100 PJ
will be realised by the year 2020, as opposed to 2012 levels. Hereby, two intermediate
4These are considered, but not added to the calculations, as EU and Dutch statistics generally focus on
direct energy emissions.
5An integral approach is realised through focussing on; decentralised energy generation, energy in-
frastructure, improvements in the CO2 trading schemes, making the transport sector more sustainable,
innovation, employment, education and financing. Hereby, citizens and corporations are actively involved
and take personal responsibility. For this they are (partially) compensated through burden reliefs described
in aspect iv.
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goals have been set; 35% energy eﬃciency needs be attained by 2016 and 65% by 2018.
Potential is recognised within the built environment, as well as for operations within indus-
try, agriculture and businesses. Especially within the built environment this is argued to
increase international competitiveness. Plans for the reuse of heat from industrial activ-
ities is given high priority (especially given that 60% of Dutch energy usage goes out to
heating buildings, predominately generated through fossil fuels (Energy Agreement, 2013;
p.29)).
Upscaling of Renewable Energy Generation— Focus on oﬀshore & onshore wind farms,
local solar energy, and biofuels. Cost eﬀectiveness is their starting point as investors need
assurance. Their investments will in turn create additional jobs and innovations. These
will successively lead to a further reduction of prices of such technologies and increase
competitiveness.
State and provinces have agreed that by the year 2019 total procurements of oﬀshore wind
power will lead to an additional 3450 Mw by the year 2023 (on top of the current 1000
Mw). Areas for construction will be designated by them. Procurements will be done yearly
by parties that have participated in the Energy Agreement. The procurements will increase
incrementally in the belief that the technology will become 40% less costly6. Subsidies
will be used, where wind parks ought be operational four years after their procurement
and subsidies. By 2020, this will add up to a total of 2050 MW oﬀshore, and 6000 MW
onshore. Stakeholders are tasked to, by July 1st, 2014, come with proposals that solve the
existing non-financial barriers which inhibit the new technologies to upscale and pervade
throughout society.
Also, the use of biomass in co-firing at coal plants shall not exceed 25 PJ. Finally, Grid
infrastructure will be introduced for oﬀshore wind parks.
Decentralised Energy Generation — To be around 40 PJ by 2020 through cooperative
initiatives of citizens and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Those who locally
generate and consume the RE will be given tax reductions of §7,5 ct/kWh. The extra costs
incurred by the government will be compensated through increasing the general energy tax.
The arrangement will be evaluated in fours years time on the basis of usage.
Energy Transmission Networks — Flexible systems that respond to supply and demand,
e.g. smart grids and demand-side management. Develop storage capacity; e.g. to encour-
age electric transportation and its infrastructure with charging stations, as well as convert
electricity to a form which can be stored.
European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) — All parties involved in this agreement
will lobby Brussels to enhance the European ETS.
Closing of Coal Plants & Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS)—By the 1st of July, 2017,
coal plants of the 80s will have been closed down. People who as a result lose their job
6This is documented as an agreement between the government and the energy sector. It must be noted
that this claim is not substantiated anywhere within the Energy Agreement
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will be assisted at a local level. CCS7 is considered as a necessity in obtaining sustainable
energy provisioning, given prolonged dependency on fossil fuels.
Mobility & Transportation — Electrical transportation is considered. The aim is to save
15 to 20 PJ by 2020 in this sector, which is the equivalent to a CO2 reduction of 1,3-1,7
Mton.
Employment — Jobs are most likely created in the sectors of construction, installation
and technology. An estimated 15.000 full-time jobs are expected to be created between
now and 2020.
Energy Innovation & Exportation — The vision is that the Netherlands will hold a top-
10 position in the global CleanTech Ranking. To facilitate this the total net value of the
clean energy technology chain will be multiplied fourth-fold by 2020, as opposed to the
2010 levels. Actual approach will be through; finance, national- and international market
development, legislation and connecting SMEs and human capital. The budget this year
will be §25 million, to be raised to §50 million/y by 2017.
Finance Programme — Allowing investments in RES, especially at local levels. Banks
have been charged with the main responsibility.
The government holds final responsibility to ensure the implementation, execution, and
evaluation of the measures indicated in the policy. This, as it is the national government
needs to live up to both the EU agreements, as well as the its own visions. The remainder
of this thesis will be centred around plans to upscale RE generation (i.e. second compo-
nent of the Energy Agreement), which sometimes inadvertently is intertwined with other
components.
7Simply put, this technique captures CO2 during combustion, compresses it, and stores it as a way of
mitigating climate change by removing the greenhouse gas out of the atmosphere. The act itself, however,
is an energy costly undertaking.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Energy Agreement for
Sustainable Growth
By using the discussed theories, this section goes about clarifying what typology this energy
transition follows. Thereafter, it will apply the analytical framework of TM presented in
fig. 3.4 and table 3.1 to the Energy Agreement policy (both for individual RESs as well as
the policy in general).
5.1 Typology of This Energy Transition
The Energy Agreement is one of the first policies that establishes the onset of the RE
transition. For that reason the policy itself, as well as its forerunners, belong to the pre-
development phase (see also fig 3.1). The measures and plans that are laid out in the
Energy Agreement however are at the initial part of the take-oﬀ phase for a complete
transition towards RE.1
Following the typology characteristics of Rotmans (2005), three levels need be explored
of the transition: targeted versus emergent nature, high versus low coordination, and
high versus low aggregation. The energy transition is clearly targeted, initiated at both
the supranational (e.g. through the EU’s 2009/28/EC Directive) and national level (e.g.
through the Energy Agreement). Even though the Energy Agreement allows for a multitude
of actors, there is still much influence from the government. It was after all the government
that initiated the Energy Agreement and set up goals and targets that needed be agreed
upon with all involved parties. As such, one can ascribe a high level of coordination to
this transition. Finally the energy transition is characterised by a high level of aggregation
since there is a clear integral approach that combines sectors and its actors. Overall, this
1Note, however, that the government doesn’t aim for 100% RE at some later stage.
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transition typology therefore complies with the typology that Rotmans (2005) has ascribed
to other energy transitions in general.
5.2 Analysis of Energy Agreement
The analysis of the Energy Agreement will focus predominately on using a lens of TM’s
three levels – strategic, tactical and operational – on the empirical data, i.e. the policy.
The clear overarching vision for the 2020 is:
Towards obtaining a fully (economically) ‘sustainable’ energy provision by 2050. Responsi-
bility is shared by government, citizens, corporations, where the government seeks to relieve
the burden for the latter two.
5.2.1 RE Visions, Pathways & Networks, Experiments
This overarching vision, however, is accomplished through the Energy Agreement’s ten
components (as listed in section 4.3). The (sub)visions for all RESs resemble transition
pathways that combined ought to realise this overarching vision. In line with this study’s
intention, focus will now turn specifically to visions augmenting RE. Each individual RES,
in light of TM’s strategic, tactical and operational levels, will be presented. Given the
succinct and limited information provided by the Energy Agreement, it is not possible to
apply table 3.1 to extreme detail for RESs. Examples which are hard to distinguish for
include; actor competencies, a full sketch of networks and/or coalitions, and instruments.
However, TM objectives, actions and instruments can still be assessed for the overall En-
ergy Agreement, which will be presented later on.
Onshore wind - 6000 MW by 2020.
Tactical pathway : Select spaces for wind parks. Allow, for example, multifunctional use
of marginal spaces along infrastructure of the state. Also discuss which areas should be
exempted or protected from wind parks (e.g. natural areas; thus one can assume that
environmental organisations are included in the location negotiations). For a more just
sharing of the burdens and the gains, investors are to set up a participation model when
developing wind energy projects of more than 15 MW. This will lead to widespread societal
support for such projects where local residents can participate as well.
Operational : Hereby a Danish example is copied, where possibly social benefits are accrued
by residents. Licensing authorities are by law allowed to put in place local requirements
that ensure societal support. Promotional strategies here vary from; shares, obligations,
to other forms of co-ownership.
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Oﬀshore wind - 2050 MW by 2020. Obtain a market leader position.
Tactical pathway : The TSO (TenneT) is, where feasible, tasked with constructing a grid
at sea. Parties within the oﬀshore wind power sector will be tasked with procurements.
Through the green deal, made between the state and the sector, cost reductions of 40% per
MWh will be realised over the period between 2014-2024. As a result of this anticipation,
upscaling will be realised incrementally over the years for maximised cost-eﬀectiveness.
Locations will be analysed and negotiated on with various interest parties. Ultimately,
appropriate oﬀshore wind park locations will be selected by the national government.
Operational : the government will create a special category within the SDE+ budget for
oﬀshore wind. Those funds are intended for experimental wind parks to give an uplift to
innovations. This is done on top of the green deal with the state to lower the costs by
40% per MWh. By 2015 a legal framework will be established to further ensure upscaling.
To expedite the increase of this technology, and to get the most state-of-the-art versions,
lead-times will be shortened by already preparing licensing issuing for those that want to
apply. Thus, tender procedures are implemented as a form of promotional strategy. Also
applied is the SDE+, as an FIT scheme, to make it more economically feasible.
Co-firing of coal plants with biomass - to not exceed 25 PJ.
Tactical pathway : By the end of 2014 sustainability demands will be formulated relating
to carbon debt, indirect land use eﬀects and sustainable forestry, on top of the NTA8080
demands. For these discussions the government, energy sector and environmental organi-
sations will be included.
Operational : Only co-firing in new coal plants or those built in the 90s. Those coal plants
from the 80 will be closed. Plans are to apply tender procedures in order to support the
planned increase2.
Other RES - 40 PJ solar energy.
Tactical pathway : There is no mention of plans to harvest wave power, tidal power, geother-
mal energy and solar warmth. Neither are there any plans by the government to foresee
in procurements of publicly-owned solar power plants. Instead, to augment solar energy
levels, measures are includes which will favour decentralised energy generation. Measures
aim to attract cooperative initiatives of citizens and SMEs.
Operational : Citizen and SMEs led cooperative initiatives can qualify for tax rebates when
they generate and consume locally generated energy. This tax rebate goes up to §7,5
ct/kWh. Such measures will also apply in the case such cooperative initiatives invest in
additional wind energy. Experiments and pilots include; wind energy around dikes, biogas
2a tender is a procedure where financial institutions or governments invite diﬀerent bidders with com-
peting oﬀers for obtaining an award of a large project or business activity. The one that receives the tender
can carry out the work or supply the goods at the bid fixed price.
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extraction during waste water treatment, heat from waste water and usage of river bank
clippings. Also considered are ways to enhance grid integration for decentralised energy
generation, possibly through tasking net operators.
Energy Transmission Network - flexible, smart grid with storage capacity.
Tactical pathway : The energy grid has to be adapted to changing energy sources. TenneT
is tasked for the needed procurements, where the government, if necessary, provides pre-
requisites. A sustainable energy action plan led by the joint grid managers will establish
the integral networks conception.
Operational : A flexible grid needs to be constructed that incorporates qualities of a so-
called ‘smart grid’3 as well as has storage capacity. The policy recognises that the infras-
tructure creates determining conditions to a sustainable energy provisioning. The integral
network should incorporate centralised and decentralised producers as well as support both
fossil fuels and RE. Financial support for R&D and experiments related to carriers which
can store available electricity when unwanted (i.e. so-called power-to-gas4).
5.2.2 TM’s Objectives, Actions & Instruments in the Energy Agreement
Now TM’s three levels and their according objectives, actions and instruments will be anal-
ysed, but this time on the policy in general:
Strategic level — anticipation, coordination, future orientation
Within the strategic level of the Energy Agreement there is a clear anticipation that tech-
nologies will become more cost-eﬃcient hence the incremental upscaling of various tech-
nologies. Apropos problem perception, the Energy Agreement takes a holistic, integrated
systems approach. It recognises that the problem can not be solved through just upscaling
RES, and that there are other hindrances involved which need to be tackled (e.g. technical
aspects related to eﬃciency of RES, access possibilities to the net for decentralised RE
generation, flexible smart-grid, net at sea to increase the level of oﬀshore wind parks, public
support for wind park locations, etc.).
This integrated systems analysis is facilitated by a high level of coordination. In this respect,
a substantial range of actors are involved at most RES, which allow for an exchange of
perspectives and agenda development. Apart from the incumbent regime actors there is
also room for non-regime cooperative initiatives, e.g. in the case of solar and onshore wind
3In a smart grid electricity prices adjust continually to demand and supply. Through providing information
it ideally influences the behaviours of consumers and producers to make them more in tune and the grid
more sustainable in its usage.
4Technology that converts electrical power into a synthetic gas fuel, for example hydrogen or methane.
The eﬃciency of this energy conversion is around 50% (Farzad, 2012)
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power. However, the main actors in all sources remain the current regime actors of inter
alia government, TSO, EDCs, etc. Even though there has been widespread involvement
of parties in the conception of the Energy Agreement, there doesn’t seem much room for
other parties to join the process from now on. One can question whether there is any room
for non-regime actors to now influence and set new goals and objectives.
Concerning future orientation, the general vision for RE by 2020 is part of a more compre-
hensive goal: namely 23% RE by 2023 and a sustainable energy provision by the year 2050.
The transition image builds upon investing predominately on wind energy and biomass.
However, this transition image provided by the Energy Agreement will in the future still be
dependent on fossil fuels, as well as nuclear energy. Furthermore, transition images have
short-sighted future orientation. This is embodied in the intermediate/incremental goals
even before the year 2020.
Tactical level — variation, selection, networks
At the tactical level there is variation in the multiple RES that are being used. Moreover,
incremental transition paths have been developed for the diﬀerent RESs.
There is also room for transition monitoring and evaluation. The Energy Agreement’s albeit
short-sighted transition images, simultaneously do act as checkpoints to monitor progress
towards the overarching goal. This in turn allows for analysis, negotiation and selection of
actions at the tactical level. Selection is also theoretically applied in the case of wind park
allocation. Here interest parties are invited to negotiate for appropriate locations. Nego-
tiation also happens between the TSO and the state in the case of the network grid, and
between the state and energy sector in case of the green deal regarding cost-eﬀectiveness
of wind power technologies.
Operational level — Experimenting, Implementation
At the operational level there is an abundance of experimenting: multiple RESs and strate-
gies are considered in order to attain a sustainable energy transition. For each individual
RES, a multitude of techniques, and especially ways of economic support, are provided
(inter alia shares, obligations, FIT scheme, tender procedures).
At the operational level, TM urges that the main parties involved are “ inventors, go-getters,
practical innovators and practical organisations” (Rotmans, 2005, p. 52). In practice,
however, it is particularly incumbent actors who are tasked with achieving the objectives
(with the exception of decentralised energy production). For example, it is the energy
sector – TSO and energy producers – who are responsible for onshore and oﬀshore wind
and increased biomass co-firing in already present coal plants. Especially with regards to
funds for R&D technologies contributing to a new grid. Support will naturally be most likely
granted to the already dominant players that are the key figures of the Energy Agreement;
particularly given that cost eﬀectiveness is the starting point to assure investors.
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5.2.3 Co-evolution
As a pre-requisite, co-evolution holds that TM’s three levels – strategic, tactical and oper-
ational – can influence one-another whilst not determining one another. At the operational
level there seems to be ample room for experiments that, in the form of subsidies, can
still apply when there are changes in network composition, i.e. changes at the tactical
level.
At the tactical level the Energy Agreement is in line with TM where there is evaluation of
projects and monitoring of progress made. This, in theory, should allow for adaptation of
the levels. In the case of better than anticipated results, experiments (such as subsidies,
SDE+, etc.) could be adjusted to ease the governmental eﬀorts. In case the opposite is
true where progress is falling behind, new visions and new solutions to expedite the problem
can be put forward.
However, it is the strategic level which is not conducive to co-evolution. Given the EU
directive that tasks the Netherlands to meet an agreement, the strategic level within the
Energy Agreement eﬀectively becomes locked-in. As such, the strategic level can only
exert influence on the underlying two layers. This relationship, however, is not reciprocal.
Naturally, the latter two still determine the outcome, i.e. the ultimate share of the RE, but
the strategic goal of 14% RE cannot be influenced by them and doesn’t change.
In the case of wind energy, either onshore or oﬀshore, the prospect seems rather rigid, given
the stringent short-term incremental goals. Evaluation of progress is planned to assess how
to expedite results if needed. This as well makes the strategic level more inflexible in case
results are not enough.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
The discussion will focus on the idea of sustainable energy as held by the Dutch National
government. Thereafter, findings from analysing the empirical material through a lens
of TM will be discussed, followed by a discourse on TM and transitions based on this
study.
6.1 Dutch Government’s Attitudes
Just like the multi-level transition theory, the Dutch government takes ecological moderni-
sation (EM) as an, albeit implicit, point of departure. EM holds that sustainability can be
reached within the current prevailing economic paradigm, industries and markets (Warner,
2010, p.540). Economy and ecology are then not mutually exclusive terms but can create
win-win opportunities. It entails business as usual where economic activities are not com-
promised when becoming more sustainable. The key, however, is to develop technologies
that allow for higher energy eﬃciency as well as generate RES that lead to higher returns.
Investments benign to the environment can also be profitable in the long-run. It pertains to
weak sustainability which sets about sustaining human welfare (i.e. GDP/capita). It follows
the ideas of Solow (1993), where in order to sustain human welfare, perfect substitutability
is implied between natural and manufactured capital.
EM also fosters faith in using market-based instruments in solving sustainability issues.
Such an approach, which relies on market mechanisms, falls within weak sustainability
(Faran, 2010). A need for regulating the market to achieve sustainability is moreover a
critical modernist approach (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.62). Evidence for this stance stems
from the government’s choice to use TM’s mechanisms that brings together all market
actors, as well as the government implementing multiple RE promotion strategies (inter
alia the SDE+ subsidies, tendering procedures, obligations, tax credits).
The Dutch government follows suit to both ecological modernisation and critical modernism
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as emphasis is put on higher energy eﬃciencies, renewable resources, and technologies that
mitigate climate change (CCS), whilst boosting the economy in the attempt of reaching the
EU objective. However, it appears to be only a recent realisation of the government that
sustainability can be economically feasible, given the backward position that the Netherlands
takes with respect to renewables.
What then, does sustainable energy imply for the Dutch government? The policy after all
doesn’t state the exact understanding of sustainable energy. Namely, the initial vision of
a completely sustainable energy provisioning by the year 2050 initially remains equivocal.
Later on the vision is re-stated and clarified upon as; “securing an energy provision that is
completely climate neutral by 2050 ”. Further on in the policy, they postulate the important
role nuclear energy has to play in assisting the energy transition and securing stable energy
provisioning in the future. Fossil fuels are, even in 2050, stated to play a critical role. The
policy furthermore announces a vision of curtailing CO2 emissions by 80 to 95%, by 2050.
For this, the usage of natural gas is pivotal in the Northwest European electricity market.
In order to obtain a completely climate neutral energy provision by the same year implies
additional measures. Therefore, the policy even mentions investments in CCS technologies
as being inevitable.
The problem with this vision is that it continues a way of thinking and practice which belongs
to the past. The fulfil a transition the contrary is required; it needs to fundamentally change
the existing society. The governments choice of embracing a continued reliance on fossil
fuels could well stand in the way of realising a full-blown sustainable energy transition.
The adoption of CCS, in particular, justifies the continued use of fossil fuels. Given that
fossil fuel stocks are projected to diminish, and fossil fuel prices are dependent on (foreign)
supply, such prices are projected to become even more volatile in the future. Apart from
already being environmentally unsustainable, the vision will thus neither be economically
sustainable.
6.2 Energy Agreement
It is evident that the Energy Agreement incorporates the theoretical knowledge of TM. The
findings illustrate how TM’s three levels are present in the policy. Moreover, it is clear that
the Energy Agreement applies a multi-level form of governing. There is a diversified pool
of actors present, there is experimenting and monitoring that allow for learning experience,
and which all aid co-evolution. The overall tone of the document is overly confident and
optimistic. One cue, however, hints at a real possibility that 14% RE by 2020 might not be
attained; where the authors explicitly state a “commitment” for 2020, with a “realisation”
in 2023 (Energy Agreement, 2013, p. 31).
The Energy Agreement focusses on fixed energy production from RES, yet does not take
into account energy behaviour. Although, the first pillar of the Energy Agreement focusses
on increasing energy eﬃciency, there is no clear awareness of what implications there might
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be if total final consumption rises. If the economy recovers and expands after the crisis,
which it is already showing signs of (NOS, 2014), then the growth of products and services
could likely lead to an increase in overall consumption. Thus, final energy consumption
could increase. The amount of investments in RE however are aimed at absolute levels.
There seem only indications that the policy calls for the evaluation of progress towards
those absolute levels and not relative developments in final energy consumption.
With regards to the RES of oﬀshore wind power the policy aims for a market leader position.
Thereby they naturally will compete again with Denmark, whom they lost to in the past
(Verbong & Geels, 2007). Yet no special commitments are discussed that would realise
such a position in the future. Cost reductions are also expected and calculated for in the
plans. With such a cost-reduction the government plans to utilise more expensive oﬀshore
areas for wind power generation. However, these cost-reductions 40% per MWh between
2014-2024 are a mere assumption and have not been substantiated. What in case these
cost-reductions don’t become reality?
The policy is negligent towards solar warmth, geothermal energy, tidal and wave power. By
neglecting these arenas, it in eﬀect misses out on a renewable resource that could aid in
meeting the 14% goal.
Now the discussion will focus on other principal drawback of the Energy Agreement in light
of TM that have come evident. These include complications with niche cultivation and
inclusion and dominance of existing regime actors:
6.2.1 Niche Cultivation and Inclusion
The authors of the Energy Agreement recognise how ambitious the set targets are. How-
ever, apart from a growing economy, most emphasis goes out to cost-eﬀectiveness. From
there on, further investments can be made that all strengthen the economy and create
additional jobs. Yet focussing on cost-eﬀectiveness risks coming at a cost of much needed
niches that will heighten RE. Niches, as mentioned, are characterised as being risky and un-
stable. They need to be protected by subsidies to ripen as to eventually be able to change
the regime. In a way this entails experiments that can fail and thus cost-eﬀectiveness
cannot always be guaranteed. This plays a role given the positive feedback relationship
between operating costs and the market share of novelties, also known as the ’network ef-
fect’ or in economic terms; ’increasing returns to scale’ (Tae-Hyeong, 2012). As a result,
new innovations and innovators will be overlooked as soon as they do not meet up the
cost-eﬀectiveness standards set. When overlooked, the chances and success of novelties
and innovations to break through are naturally slimmed down. Inadvertently, it is unlikely
that niches will eventually arise that fundamentally challenge the prevailing structures of
the regime. In line with Geels (2004)’s MLP; the micro-level remains underdeveloped and
as such cannot exercise pressure on the structures of the meso-level. Consequently, a focus
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on cost-eﬀectiveness that neglects niches jeopardises a thorough transition of the societal
system.
This pressure factor of cost-eﬀectiveness is further exacerbated by the limited time. As
argued before, the 2009/28/EC directive indirectly causes the Energy Agreements tactical
level to become fixed. Abiding the EU-directive is obviously for a good cause. Given the
limited time and the incremental targets set for nearly every (other) year for RES, however,
the policy becomes rigid. In eﬀect emphasis is put on already performing technologies,
limiting novelties which needing maturing. As Geels (2004) argued, it takes considerable
time before an experiment has been carried out, evaluated and deemed successful for
further development and/or expansion. According to Rotmans (2005) the time can easily
go up to 5 or even 10 years (p. 50). In case of a full transition in 2050 this in itself
is not worrisome. However, in light of the 2009/28/EC directive goals, the Netherlands
simply hasn’t got that time luxury. One could ponder about what is best: investing ample
time to initiate thought-through experiments that ultimately lead to a transition on the
on hand, or focussing on meeting incremental changes that ultimately might not challenge
the prevailing regime to the fullest extent on the other. The latter case thereby doesn’t
cultivate niches nor includes them. Unwittingly, it increases risks for a back-lash or lock-in
transition – see also Rotmans (2005) (or fig. 3.1 on page 12).
The limited time-frame due to the RE goal of 14% by 2020 also led to incremental
(sub)goals, which do not suﬃciently incorporate costs-benefit considerations and limited
investments in R&D. Take, for example, the case of photovoltaic (PV) technologies which
are developing at an ever faster pace. Investing more on R&D in this field ultimately allows
for enhanced technologies that contribute more cost-eﬀectively to the 14% goal. Moreover,
the limited time frame has the policy invest copiously on wind energy but simultaneously it
rules out R&D and innovation for this RES. The dire consequence is that these wind parks
which will sprout around the country in the coming five years could most likely obsolete in
20 years time (Bakas, 2014). In that respect, the Energy Agreement invests in outdated
technology that likely becomes obsolete instead of allowing for new innovations which TM
calls for.
6.2.2 Dominance of Regime Actors
Unfortunately, it has proven hard to derive from the Energy Agreement which specific
actors are involved in each vision/experiment/RES. Moreover, it is hard to test for actor
fluidity; i.e. the ability of new actors to enter and/or leave throughout the process. These,
as mentioned in the limitations section, can’t be documented given that this is an ex-ante
study. It would, however, have been beneficial to have documentation of the current state,
that is who are the main actors in the networks. Also, the policy only mentions a few
negotiations that are pending.
This inherent complication of adopting (TM’s) incrementalism to a high degree as men-
tioned previously, also allows for a sustained reliance on incumbent regime actors. As dis-
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cussed before, the power of TM is envisioning goals for the long-term and setting shorter
term objectives - hence the term directed incrementalism. However, this is also contradic-
tory given the shorter term objectives. No guarantee is given that objectives and actions
are not short-term natured, which naturally seems the case with annually or biennially goals.
In that way the transition will be particularly executed within and by the current regime
which could hamper its ultimate success. A similar notion was found by Kern & Smith
(2008) who found a dominance of regime actors in a diﬀerent Dutch policy. As mentioned
earlier, this could hinder the ability to break existing path-dependencies and present rein-
forcements that strengthen the current regime (Loorbach, 2004). Rotmans (2005) himself
already problematised the role that governments play within a transition: “[B]y steering
transition processes in the classical way through command, control and regulations, the
government itself forms an enormous barrier to the realization of societal transitions.” (p.
56). Its role therefore becomes ambiguous; it plays a role in facilitating and participat-
ing in the transition but it in itself also needs to alter and sway along with the ongoing
transition.
A dominance of the regime, and the government in particular, is pronounced in the case
of wind parks (being it either onshore or oﬀshore). Such areas for construction have been
largely (pre-)selected by the government. However, this way of governing takes again the
form of authoritarian rule. This in part explains the current social upheaval related to both
onshore or oﬀshore wind parks. Disapproval is not limited to NIMBYs1 but is also shared
by both the tourist and the trading industries (the latter in the case of a wind park near
the international harbour of Rotterdam). Businesses and investors fear that they will suﬀer
profit losses as tourism will be diverted towards other beaches that do not feature ‘visibility
pollution’. The Rotterdam harbour, on the other hand, foresees that a wind park near the
harbour mouth will disturb freight traﬃc when entering/leaving the port. Altogether, more
than 100 action groups have already sprung up.
In this respect one aspect of TM has been partly overruled (be it intentionally or uninten-
tionally). Theoretically it has been applied as the state allowed diverse interest parties to
participate in the making of the Energy Agreement in itself. However, in practice some
decision making is still too one-sided and follows a mostly top-down approach, something
that TM opposes.
6.3 TM as a Tool to Facilitate Transitions within Policies
6.3.1 Directed Incrementalism
The above described issues of; limited time-frame, cost-eﬀectiveness pursuit pressures,
and sustained reliance on incumbent regime actors, all seem to arise from an intrinsic
1NIMBY is an acronym for the phrase “Not In My Back Yard” that refers to citizens who oppose
something being built in close proximity to their neighbourhood.
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feature of TM: (directed) incrementalism. This feature of TM poses a problem. Rotmans
(2005) argues why directed incrementalism is eﬀective; as there is an overarching longer-
term vision to incremental changes. However, if intermediate goals are set at too narrow
intervals, policies turn rigid. By setting incremental targets for every(other) year, the
pressure on cost-eﬀectiveness and a need to perform instantly increases on the short-term.
At present, viable options need be selected if targets are to be met in one or two years.
This doesn’t allow time to invest in and attract niches that are not yet ripe or which at
present are not yet included within the Energy Agreement. It seems unfeasible to allow
room for diverse experiments, niche cultivation and evaluation if there are continuously set
short-term targets. However, social learning processes which lead to co-evolution are much
warranted, for that is the cornerstone of TM. Probably not the intention of Kemp et al.
(2007) but this detail of directed incrementalism should be taken into account for future
policies. TM in itself should thus incorporate parameters to directed incrementalism.
One of the ideas of TM is that actors should continually be able to enter and leave networks
and the general transition process (actor fluidity). However, actor fluidity is also more
diﬃcult when there is a pressure to act right now through incremental features. This
in turn, makes the position of potential niches weaker. For how does this allow for the
assimilation of new radical niches? It seems that the directed incremental steps only focus
on already existing technologies and techniques in these cases. Techniques that at the
time of the Energy Agreement’s inception were ready for implementation. In the case of
TM one can ponder how this theory ought enforce a stronger focus on novelties and how
to manage them. In that case it would come in handy to incorporate elements of niche
management that would foster niches more and allow for a better integration with novelties
that do not fall within the current regime (see; Kemp et al., 1998).
In conjunction with directed incrementalism, TM’s overly optimistic stance towards the
role of governments and regime actors forms an additional drawback. A similar conclusion
was also found by Kern & Smith (2008). This in part could explain the finding of low
niche cultivation and inclusion. Although TM in theory works well it is hard to allow for
regime outsiders to be structurally in practice, especially in the case of niches as seen with
directed incrementalism. In practice it are mostly the regime actors that set and allow for
the short-sighted incremental goals. Thereby the transition is mainly initiated and led by
the current regime. It thus has too much influence by not being under adequate pressure
from niches.
6.3.2 Supranational Aspect to TM
The findings show a need to add an external, supranational level to the analytical framework
of TM2. Rotmans (2005) discusses how transition policy needs to be incorporated at the
international level. He however, fails to recognise how the international level should be
2As opposed to for example the MLP which already incorporate it indirectly through the macro-level.
TM’s framework, as especially evident in fig 3.4, however, does not integrate it.
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incorporated into TM. We live in a ever-globalised world. Therefore not incorporating an
international influence to the process is a shortcoming of the theory. For societal transitions
to occur within a given country there are also external influences that might aid or give
impetus, e.g. the Montreal protocol which phased out CFCs3.
In the case of the Energy Agreement the strategic level is locked-in because of the inter-
national level. Given that the international level sets the strategic level of the national
transition, this strategic level cannot co-evolve and interact with the tactical and oper-
ational levels. Consequently, international agreements form an external factor that does
not enter the current dialogue of co-evolution in the transition process. The theoreti-
cal knowledge of TM firstly needs to acknowledge the external, international influence on
nation-wide transition facilitation. Thereon, supranational influence needs to be embedded
within the analytical framework of TM.
3chlorofluorocarbon; an organic compound. Was widely used as a refrigerant until it was found that it
contributes to ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
This study set about assessing the imminent eﬃcacy of the Dutch Energy Agreement to
initiate transition and meet its objective of 14% RE by 2020. It did this by analysing the em-
pirical data through a lens of TM, identifying the strategic, tactical and operational levels,
and their respective objectives, actions and instruments, as well as co-evolution.
It found that the transition follows a targeted typology with a high level of both coordination
and aggregation. As such it has much governmental interference and takes on an integral
approach. It was also found that the Netherlands fosters an EM approach to the sustain-
ability issue, where it acknowledges a continued reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear energy,
apart from RE, even in 2050. Overall, the Energy Agreement policy follows the theoretical
ideas of TM to a large extent, where there is a multi-level and multi-actor approach to
attain the visions. Nevertheless, there are some parts within the Energy Agreement that
are worrisome and can prove detrimental to its own success.
Firstly, the strategic level is locked-in due to external influence (in this case the EU initi-
ated 2009/28/EC directive which is fixed). Thereby co-evolution between the three levels
is hampered. Moreover, the Energy Agreement focuses predominately on incumbent regime
actors to execute the transition. However, such actors would have a hard time to over-
come lock-in mechanisms and path dependencies. The visions have a strong focus on
cost-eﬀectiveness. Combined with the short time frame to attain the 2020 goal, niche
innovations outside of the regime are currently severely overlooked. Cultivating new niches
and novel innovations could be the key to shifting the current paradigm and fulfilling a true
transition.
The findings also point towards drawbacks of TM in itself. For example, too much faith
fostered in the dominant regime and government. As a result enhanced niche participation
and inclusion is warranted to ensure the regime is fundamentally challenged. Furthermore,
parameters are needed for directed incrementalism to allow more time for niches to ripen.
Finally, this study illustrates the need to add an external, supranational level to be incor-
porated in the analytical framework of TM to facilitate co-evolution.
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